Coronial
NSWhospital

Inquest into the death of Paul Lau

Deceased

Paul Lau

Demographics

54y, male

Coroner

Decision ofActing State Coroner O'Sullivan

Date of death

2015-06-19

Finding date

2018-03-29

Cause of death

aspiration pneumonia caused by multiple drug toxicity

AI-generated summary

Paul Lau, aged 54, died from aspiration pneumonia caused by opioid toxicity following ACL reconstruction surgery. The death resulted from a prescribing error where anaesthetist Dr K. inadvertently prescribed a 100mcg/hour Fentanyl patch and Fentanyl PCA intended for another patient (GS) to Paul's chart. This critical error was not detected by hospital staff despite multiple opportunities: recovery nurses did not question the unusual Fentanyl PCA order; ward nurses failed to recognise the danger of combining two opioid modes of delivery; and Dr K. did not investigate when seeing Paul wearing the patch and PCA on the evening of surgery. The coroner identified systemic failures in handover practices, inadequate opioid awareness among nursing staff, poor alert response in the electronic system, and failures of critical thinking. Multiple staff made errors: the dispensing pharmacist failed to question the unusual strong-dose patch for an opioid-naïve patient; ward nurses lacked knowledge to recognise the dangerous drug combination; and an AIN failed to escalate signs of opioid overdose. The case exemplifies how electronic prescribing systems require vigilance, and how medication errors propagate when multiple safety checks fail due to knowledge gaps and poor communication.

AI-generated summary and tagging — may contain inaccuracies; refer to original finding for legal purposes. Report an inaccuracy.

Specialties

anaesthesiaorthopaedic surgerypharmacy

Error types

diagnosticmedicationcommunicationsystemdelay

Drugs involved

fentanylfentanyl pcaropivacaineoxycodoneparacetamolcelecoxib

Clinical conditions

opioid toxicityrespiratory depressionaspiration pneumoniaover-sedationapnoeacoronary artery disease

Procedures

ACL reconstruction surgerygeneral anaesthesiaintubation (attempted during resuscitation)manual resuscitation

Contributing factors

  • prescribing error by anaesthetist - Fentanyl patch and Fentanyl PCA prescribed to wrong patient
  • failure to detect prescribing error by pharmacy staff
  • failure to detect prescribing error by nursing staff in recovery and ward
  • failure of anaesthetist to recognise prescribing error during post-operative ward visit
  • poor handover practices between recovery and ward staff
  • inadequate opioid awareness among nursing staff
  • failure to recognise danger of dual opioid delivery modes
  • failure to escalate signs of patient deterioration
  • inadequate patient observation by assistant in nursing
  • TrakCare alert system - overriding alerts in batches without careful review
  • lack of verification of patient identity in electronic prescribing
  • lack of structured post-operative pain plan communication

Coroner's recommendations

  1. Establish a working party comprising IT, Anaesthetics Department, Nursing directorate, Pharmacy and Patient Safety Manager to review lessons learned and implement reforms
  2. Conduct staff seminars with Anaesthetics, Nursing and Pharmacy staff on missed opportunities in Paul Lau's case, addressing communication, handover, opioid policy, high-risk medication observation, Schedule 8 checks and responding to patient deterioration
  3. Implement patient identity verification in TrakCare before submitting medication orders, including manual entry of patient name or urgent interim measures
  4. Add 'current medications' or 'medications history' field to pre-anaesthetic assessment in TrakCare
  5. Add 'post-operative pain plan' field to Recovery Progress Notes template in TrakCare
  6. Investigate feasibility of alerts when medications added to patient chart after transfer to PACU/Recovery
  7. Review TrakCare alert system: reduce alert numbers, remove default batch override, create alert hierarchy, implement distinct alert for duplicate prescribing, optimise alert presentation (font, format, sound, colour, placement)
  8. Implement mandatory TrakCare proficiency assessment by independent person using simulations/scenarios for anaesthetists as part of medical practitioner accreditation
  9. Conduct handover seminars with nursing and anaesthetics staff including simulations, feedback and mechanisms to enhance communication
  10. Conduct regular audits of handover practices with priority to PACU/Recovery, publish results on hospital intranet
  11. Review perioperative management including monitoring of high-risk medications, post-operative anaesthetist review in PACU/Recovery and ward, introduction of pain service, and alignment with relevant clinical guidelines
Full text

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