Coronial
WAcommunity

Inquest into the Death of MR TOBY

Deceased

MR TOBY

Demographics

45y, male

Date of death

2012-08-25

Finding date

2015-09-17

Cause of death

Head injury from motor vehicle rollover

AI-generated summary

Mr Toby, a 45-year-old Indigenous male with significant alcohol problems, died from head injuries sustained in a motor vehicle rollover on 25 August 2012. Police attempted a random breath test on an unsealed road north of Kununurra; Mr Toby failed to stop and was pursued at Priority 2 emergency driving level. His vehicle rolled on a left-hand bend after he lost control. Critical clinical lessons include: Mr Toby had a blood alcohol of 0.255% (highly impaired judgment), was not wearing a seatbelt, had windows down leading to ejection during the roll. The post-mortem revealed extensive skull fractures, rib fractures, internal injuries and aspiration. The coroner found death arose by accident. Police followed procedures they believed were correct at the time, though later clarification of emergency driving policies revealed Priority 2 pursuit was not appropriate. Key learning: the ambiguity in emergency driving guidelines created misunderstanding; had policies been clearer, pursuit would not have occurred.

AI-generated summary and tagging — may contain inaccuracies; refer to original finding for legal purposes.

Contributing factors

  • Loss of control on left-hand bend of unsealed road
  • Oversteering to correct trajectory of vehicle
  • Failure to wear seatbelt
  • Wound down windows allowing ejection during rollover
  • High blood alcohol concentration (0.255%) impairing judgment
  • Vehicle three-quarter rollover
  • High motivation to evade police (subject to bail breach and DUI charges)

Coroner's recommendations

  1. Clarify emergency driving guidelines and policies to remove apparent contradictions and ambiguities regarding Priority 2 pursuit authorisation
  2. Provide explicit training on emergency driving policies for all police officers, particularly those in the role of Police Operations Centre Communications Controller (POCCC) in remote and rural areas
  3. Ensure training on emergency driving covers continuous risk assessment, concepts of target driver motivation to avoid apprehension, and known risks to community
  4. Consider use of term 'not active pursuit' instead of current terminology in Priority 2 driving definitions to clarify permissible activities
  5. Ensure new emergency driving policy documents being produced do not contain apparent contradictions
  6. Establish whether separate policies are needed for pursuit driving versus emergency driving priorities, or one unified policy
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