multiple injuries sustained from a 25-metre fall down an unprotected stope when a loaded haul dump vehicle fell over the edge
AI-generated summary
A 45-year-old experienced loader operator died when his vehicle fell 25 metres down an unprotected underground stope while attempting to place a rock bund at its edge. The incident occurred due to multiple contributing factors: ambiguous instructions regarding preparation of the stope for surveying; the deceased's misinterpretation of these instructions; inadequate risk assessment procedures (the deceased assessed a high-risk task as 'low' risk); removal of bollard warnings without clear authorisation; poor visibility exacerbated by dust and a slight bend in the drive; and a maintenance defect where two bolts were missing from the loader seat, increasing fatal injuries. Key lessons include the critical need for formal team-based risk assessments for work near open holes, physical hard barriers preventing equipment access to voids, proper maintenance and inspection protocols, clarification of supervisor instructions, and emphasis on not relying solely on lower-level operator risk assessments for hazardous tasks.
AI-generated summary and tagging — may contain inaccuracies; refer to original finding for legal purposes.
inadequate risk assessment - operator assessed high-risk task as low-risk
removal of bollard safety barriers without clear authorisation
poor visibility in the drive due to dust from ventilation fan
slight left-hand bend in the drive creating optical illusion about stope edge
flat floor of stope making edge difficult to identify
missing bolts on loader seat reducing restraint effectiveness
operator unfamiliarity with CMS survey procedures from top level
supervisor not present during the task execution
reliance on lower-level operator risk assessments without quality control
Coroner's recommendations
Mine operators should manage the hazard of open holes by designing, constructing and locating physical hard barriers to prevent equipment from accessing the edge of open holes
Hard barriers should be used in conjunction with lower-level access control systems such as signage, demarcation and lockable barriers controlled by persons in authority
Formal, team-based risk assessments should be required where manned equipment is required to work near open holes
There should be no reliance solely on lower-level assessments made by operators
The assessment process should consider the use of alternative technology or techniques that remove the need for an operator to go near an open hole
Ongoing reinforcement in the use of lower-level risk assessment tools to ensure they are being used correctly
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