Inquest into the death of Jason Challis

Contributing factors

• Failure to conduct mandatory walk-throughs of the range for participants
• Failure to conduct mandatory dry fire rehearsals on the specific range
• Failure to conduct blank fire rehearsals before live fire
• Failure to count and check stacks to verify all team members were positioned correctly
• Inadequate progression of training for inexperienced soldiers
• No marking of no-go zones or danger areas outside buildings
• Conflicting interpretation of doctrine regarding dynamic versus staged training
• Inadequate command oversight and training
• Dislocation of the team during building entry, causing soldiers to separate
• No designated entrance briefing or familiarization with the range layout
• Inexperienced Section with all junior members having joined between February-July 2016
• Time pressures due to weather and scheduled exercises preventing proper training progression
• Resistance to implementing recommendations from the 2009 Cultana incident

Coroner's recommendations

1. Army should resolve confusion as to the interpretation of Chapter 6 Annex J, LWP-G 7-3-1 by making explicit what rehearsals are mandatorily required to be undertaken by participants on a range prior to live fire exercise use
2. If rehearsals are determined to be required, the mandatory requirement should be highlighted in the Annex as has been done with walk-through requirements
3. The Cultana Report recommendation that 'no-go areas behind concealed targets be marked on the outside of the walls containing such targets' should be included in doctrine