Inquest into the death of Tateolena TAUAIFAGA

Contributing factors

• Inadequate risk assessment of covert investigative strategy by Metropolitan Robbery Unit
• Failure to arrest suspect at earlier opportunity despite sufficient evidence of driving stolen vehicle
• Inadequate geographical intelligence and planning for high-risk vehicle intercept location
• TOU operatives followed Audi through residential property fence without knowing contents of yard
• TOU operatives continued pursuit through recreational park with children despite extreme risk
• Highway Patrol officers unaware of tracker device and phone interception on vehicle
• Lack of communication between MRU and responding Highway Patrol regarding intelligence assets
• Failure to terminate pursuit when dangerous driving behaviour escalated
• Absence of In-Car Video and Body-Worn Camera recording on TOU vehicles limited accountability

Coroner's recommendations

1. The Commissioner should give further consideration to whether the investigative strategy of utilising a stolen vehicle as part of an ongoing investigative strategy is appropriate
2. If the Commissioner considers such a strategy appropriate, provide guidance to NSWPF members as to circumstances in which it should and should not be deployed
3. Ensure police involved in investigations place emphasis on considering arrest strategies from the outset
4. Establish appropriate procedure to assess risks of investigative strategies and weigh perceived benefits against risks
5. Review TOU training on criminal and driving history of HRVI subjects; geographical area surrounding HRVI; obtaining information about escape routes; contingencies; and possibility of public entry
6. Amend policies requiring TOU operatives to obtain geographical information about HRVI areas prior to attempt
7. Review TOU training on radio channel switching, monitoring local channel if HRVI unsuccessful, and timely communication updates
8. Amend communications policies requiring team leaders to switch to local channel when HRVI unsuccessful
9. Clarify policies so all officers are aware of radio protocol during and after unsuccessful HRVI
10. Provide clear guidance on when TOU vehicles may participate in pursuit when HRVI unsuccessful
11. Provide clear communication of when attempted HRVI can no longer be performed and subsequent attempts constitute pursuit
12. Establish requirement for Highway Patrol vehicles with ICV systems to activate those systems during HRVI attempts
13. Provide training to all police on importance of communicating information to Vehicle Knowledge Group supervisor throughout pursuit
14. Review feasibility of installing In-Car Video systems in TOU vehicles
15. Investigate ways to equip TOU operatives with Body-Worn Video cameras