Coronial
NSWcommunity

Inquest into the death of Huy Neng Ngo

Deceased

Huy Neng Ngo

Demographics

57y, male

Date of death

2017-07-13

Finding date

2021-11-19

Cause of death

penetrating injury to the neck sustained from a piece of metal propelled from a defective Takata airbag which malfunctioned when it deployed in a minor collision

AI-generated summary

Mr Huy Neng Ngo, age 57, died on 13 July 2017 from a penetrating neck injury caused by a metal fragment propelled from a defective Takata airbag that ruptured during a minor motor vehicle collision. The vehicle's driver-side airbag had been subject to a voluntary recall (5ZV) since July 2015, notified to Ms Chea in multiple letters from November 2015 onwards. Ms Chea booked the vehicle for airbag replacement on 30 March 2017, with a scheduled date of 11 July 2017, but the appointment was cancelled when the couple's daughter rang to say they would be late. Peter Warren's operator reboked the vehicle for 5 October 2017 without adequately exploring whether a late appointment was feasible. The inquest identified substantial failures in regulation and communication: the ACCC and DIRD had unclear roles and inadequate coordination in monitoring the voluntary recall; Honda Australia's consumer letters used tentative language ("precautionary", "potential concern") and did not clearly convey the risk of death from metal fragments; neither regulator took steps to publicise the risks via media campaigns before Mr Ngo's death, despite knowing of a misdeployment incident in September 2016 and a serious injury in April 2017; and Peter Warren should have accommodated the late appointment on 11 July 2017 given the known risks and staff capacity. These systemic failures, combined with weak consumer communications, meant the defect was not conveyed with urgency or clarity to the Ngo family, and the recall was not progressed as rapidly as it should have been.

AI-generated summary and tagging — may contain inaccuracies; refer to original finding for legal purposes.

Contributing factors

  • defective Takata airbag inflator (SDI family, tablet-shaped PSAN propellant, non-desiccated)
  • inadequate description of defect and risk in consumer recall letters and regulatory notifications
  • use of tentative language ("precautionary", "potential concern") in recall communications
  • failure to publicise the defect and risks via media releases or advertising campaigns
  • delays in arranging airbag replacement due to dealer capacity constraints
  • confusion and lack of clarity between ACCC and DIRD as to respective regulatory roles
  • inadequate monitoring of recall strategies and consumer communications by regulators
  • failure to follow up concerns raised by DIRD officer Jeremy Thomas and academic Luke Nottage about recall correspondence
  • Peter Warren's cancellation of the 11 July 2017 appointment without adequately exploring whether a late appointment was feasible
  • absence of risk assessment and escalation processes between ACCC and DIRD
  • failure to publicise misdeployment incident in BMW vehicle (September 2016) and serious injury in Northern Territory (April 2017)

Coroner's recommendations

  1. Honda Australia: implement system whereby Honda dealers are given notice of numbers of consumers affected by recalls in their Prime Marketing Area
  2. Honda Australia: conduct due diligence and inquiries with parent company to ensure defect and nature of risk are adequately and accurately communicated in notifications to ACCC, DIRD and consumers
  3. FCAI: undertake review of Code of Practice to make express provision for considering recall communications strategy based on nature of defect, assessed level of risk, and urgency for rectification
  4. FCAI: provide detailed guidance on development of recall strategies including use of multiple communication channels and adaptation based on customer response
  5. FCAI: provide substantive guidance on appearance and contents of written recall communications using visual aids and clear language that does not downplay risk
  6. FCAI: provide clarification on interaction between FCAI Code and ACCC Guidelines
  7. FCAI: incorporate reference to RVS Act and include detail on conducting risk identification and assessment
  8. FCAI and ACCC/DIRD: include guideline requiring members to conduct due diligence with parent company to ensure adequate communication of defect and risk, and timely notification of updated knowledge
  9. ACCC and DIRD: liaise to provide FCAI with suggested changes to FCAI Code
  10. ACCC and DIRD: develop and publish guidance material on intended interaction between ACCC Guidelines and FCAI Code
  11. ACCC and DIRD: put in place written protocols assigning responsibility for reviewing effectiveness of consumer recall communications and providing training to officers
  12. ACCC and DIRD: finalise policy document outlining escalation process for DIRD to request ACCC to exercise compulsory powers
  13. ACCC and DIRD: develop written protocol clarifying respective roles in relation to product recalls and process for treating information as commercially sensitive or confidential
  14. DIRD: develop policy and protocols for carrying out investigations into complaints involving motor vehicle componentry and airbags, with clear communications and record keeping
  15. DIRD: develop protocol maintaining register of misdeployments and investigations, with information made public and provided to police and coronial units
  16. DIRD: reconsider extent of reliance on benchmark recall completion figures and develop written protocols assessing supplier recall efficacy based on comprehensive risk assessment
  17. DIRD: consider engaging in study to assess feasibility of setting Standard in respect of airbag performance and vulnerability to misdeployment
  18. TfNSW: consider sending warning letters to owners of vehicles subject to voluntary recalls for defective Takata airbags and/or introduce registration sanctions for such vehicles
Full text

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