Inquest into fire at Wambelong Camp Ground, Warrumbungles National Park, New South Wales

Contributing factors

• High fuel loads in Browns Creek area not burned for 40 years
• Extreme weather: high temperature, low humidity, strong winds changing direction
• High atmospheric instability indicated by C-Haines index of 12-13
• Vorticity-driven lateral spread phenomenon not incorporated in fire prediction models
• Fire prediction models inaccurate in extreme conditions
• Initial fire classification as Class 1 rather than Class 2 or Class 3
• Inadequate incident management support and resources overnight
• Back burn operation conducted in unfavourable weather conditions
• Delayed and inadequate emergency community warnings
• Insufficient aerial support in early response

Coroner's recommendations

1. Rural Fire Service propose arrangement with Bureau of Meteorology to deploy weather balloons for assessing atmospheric instability during severe to catastrophic fire danger
2. RFS develop capacity to deploy weather balloons and mobile weather stations
3. RFS redraft fire prediction disclaimers to clarify potential errors, omissions, and how to detect them
4. RFS amend fire prediction reports to include checklist of significant factors not able to be considered in prediction model
5. Include fire behaviour analyst in incident management team for Class 3 fire-fighting operations
6. RFS extend pre-emptive section 44 to whole Castlereagh RFS/Warrumbungle Shire area
7. RFS and land managers develop program for regular stakeholder engagement on hazard and incident management every two months
8. RFS and NPWS adopt approach where classification and resourcing reflect potential for fire rather than observed behaviour
9. RFS and NPWS introduce training on atmospheric instability and vorticity-driven lateral spread effects on fire behaviour
10. RFS and NPWS develop land management policy requiring active engagement with adjoining property owners on hazard reduction
11. RFS and NPWS amend protocols for upgrading warning levels to emphasise urgency as danger increases
12. RFS and NPWS review procedures for requesting aerial support to reduce delays in severe or worse conditions
13. NPWS devise policy enabling John Renshaw Parkway closure during bushfire without impeding emergency vehicle access
14. NPWS incorporate worst-case scenario training in fire-fighting protocols and exercises
15. NPWS review guidelines on hazard reduction planning in light of increasing fire intensity and vorticity-driven lateral spread
16. NPWS review protocols for Class 1 fire control to ensure adequate incident management planning support
17. NPWS review procedures for monitoring Class 1 fires in severe conditions and include aerial surveillance as standard
18. NPWS adopt pre-emptive planning and deployment posture for incident management teams during severe fire conditions
19. NPWS alert relevant organisations early when adopting pre-emptive posture and advise their assistance may be required
20. NPWS review fire weather training regime and adopt Victoria's post-2009 bushfire training courses
21. NPWS review hazard reduction policies to ensure all assets identified and adequate management plans exist
22. NPWS review prescribed burns program to ensure timely managerial approvals as promptly as possible
23. NPWS develop land management policy requiring hazard reduction around assets and fire trail clearing before fire season